How is dvi liquidating trust sex dating in clewiston florida

We conclude that the RCRA claims fail as a matter of law and affirm the denial of enforcement as to the RCRA claims. Moreover, CERCLA, like the Coal Act, created new and unique obligations arising out of previous conduct. The Oil Companies' CERCLA claims therefore arose post-petition. The Oil Companies' CERCLA claims Were Not Discharged In Duplan's Bankruptcy Proceeding Appellants also assert that even if we conclude, as we have, that the CERCLA claims arose post-petition, the claims were discharged by virtue of having arisen prior to the issuance of the Final Decree. Under the Act, the drafters of a plan of reorganization were required to include certain provisions, but were otherwise left to their own discretion in including “any other appropriate provisions not inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter.” 11 U. This interpretation directly undermines the statutorily required binding effect of the Plan and Final Decree on all creditors regardless of whether they accept the Plan, file proofs of their claims, or succeed in getting their claims scheduled or allowed. Any of the Oil Companies' claims that arose during the reorganization arose out of Duplan's prior and continuing business activities and is therefore an Administrative Claim under the Plan. The issue here is whether the particular common law claims asserted by the Oil Companies arose pre- or post-petition. We affirm the denial of relief on the RCRA claims for the reasons stated herein. On June 9, 1999, this Court granted the unopposed motion to substitute Norman Halper and Oliver Lazare as coexecutors of the Estate of Paul Lazare. Unless otherwise noted, all references to Title 11 of the United States Code are references to the Act.3. Case law under the Bankruptcy Code, however, is persuasive because the definition of claim under the Code is similar to the definition of claim under the Act to the extent that both “require[ ] a legal ‘right’ to be in existence at the time of the filing.” Chateaugay II, 53 F.3d at 497.9. (In re Manville Forest Products Corp.), 209 F.3d 125 (2d Cir.2000), is not to the contrary. After confirmation of the Plan, a statute was enacted creating liability on the part of Olin for the clean-up of contaminated property. The Court held that Olin's claims under the indemnification agreement arose pre-petition because “Olin brought a contract cause of action based on a pre-petition contract, not a statutory claim for indemnification under a statute enacted [after] confirmation.” Id. The Court specifically distinguished “cases which held that a claim flowing directly from a statute enacted post-petition is not discharged by confirmation even if based upon pre-petition acts.” Id.

C., New York, NY, of counsel), for Appellants Andrea Gal, Paul Lazare, Norman Halper as co-executor of the Estate of Paul Lazare and Oliver Lazare as co-executor of the Estate of Paul Lazare. For the following reasons, we agree with the District Court's affirmance of the decision of the Bankruptcy Court to deny enforcement of the Final Decree as to the CERCLA claims. The Penn Central court held that:it was not until the passage of CERCLA that a legal relationship was created between the petitioners and [the debtor] relevant to the petitioners' potential causes of action such that an interest could flow․Here, because CERCLA had not yet been enacted, the petitioners lacked this cause of action against [the debtor] prior to the Consummation Date.944 F.2d at 168. Claims under CERCLA “simply did not exist” before CERCLA's enactment on December 11, 1980. Duplan filed its petition on August 31, 1976, and the Oil Companies' CERCLA claims against Duplan arose at the earliest on December 11, 1980. In such a case, any creditor whose claim arose prior to the filing of the petition, but who did not bother to file a proof of claim, or who filed a proof of claim disallowed by the court, would avoid discharge of its claim. Any claim that arose during the reorganization, i.e., after the filing of the petition and before the reorganization was complete, in the ordinary course of Duplan's (or Panex's) business, is an Administrative Claim under the Plan. A common law basis for claims of strict liability and equitable disgorgement, however, existed long before the petition was filed and thus are not covered by the lower courts' analyses of the CERCLA claims. Accordingly, we vacate the District Court's affirmance of the Bankruptcy Court's denial of relief and remand for further proceedings. CONCLUSIONFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court insofar as it held that the Oil Companies' CERCLA claims were not discharged in Duplan's bankruptcy proceeding, and denied the motion to enforce the permanent injunction in the Final Decree as to those claims. 2549, 2683 (providing that prior law and procedures apply to cases initiated before the effective date of the Bankruptcy Code, October 1, 1979). The Virgin Islands District Court also dismissed the Oil Companies' RCRA claims against the other appellants for failure to state a claim because section 6972(b)(2)(B)(iv) specifically prohibited the Oil Companies from bringing the claims. Case law under the Act regarding when a claim arises is sparse.

After the confirmation hearing, by order dated June 4, 1981 (the “Confirmation Order”), the District Court confirmed the reorganization trustee's Amended Plan of Reorganization (the “Plan”). In Chateaugay II, this Court held that claims against the bankrupt debtor under the Coal Act for contribution to a health and benefit fund for retired coal miners (the “Fund”), were not discharged as pre-petition claims because the claims “arose” upon the enactment of the Coal Act, which (like CERCLA in this case) was enacted after the petition was filed but before confirmation of the plan.

For the purposes of implementing the Plan, the Confirmation Order permanently enjoined all creditors from asserting, commencing, or continuing any “claims” against Duplan (which by order dated July 15, 1981 amending the Plan, was renamed Panex Industries, Inc. The Plan defines “creditor” as “the holder of a Claim” and “Claim” as:[a]ny claim against either of the Debtors or the property of either of the Debtors, whether or not provable under Section 63 of the Bankruptcy Act, whether secured or unsecured, liquidated or unliquidated, fixed or contingent, which arose prior to the filing by the Debtors of the Petitions, proof of which was filed on or before July 10, 1979, or such other date as designated by the Court, and which has been or is hereafter allowed by the Court․Plan at B-2. Co., 903 F.2d 910, 912 (2d Cir.1990) (“The proper standard for appellate review of a pure textual construction by the district court, whatever the procedural posture of the case, is de novo.”). The Oil Companies' CERCLA Claims Arose Post-Petition The lower courts correctly found, and the parties do not appear to dispute, that if the Oil Companies' CERCLA claims arose before the filing of the petition on August 31, 1976, the claims were discharged in Duplan's bankruptcy proceeding. The Court first noted that:the existence of a valid bankruptcy claim depends on (1) whether the claimant possessed a right to payment, and (2) whether that right arose before the filing of the petition.

I.) Counsel to HOVENSA LLC, once owner of one of the ten largest oil refineries in the world, in its chapter 11 case. The case represented the first effort to reorganize a public Dominican Republic corporation under Chapter 11 of the U.

With billion in assets at the time of filing, MF Global was the largest bankruptcy filing of 2011 and the eighth-largest in U. Currently represent the FFR Trust, the liquidating trust that was formed post-petition to liquidate the debtors’ remaining assets, resolve claims, and facilitate distributions to creditors.(Bankr. Extended Stay is the largest bankruptcy filing in the history of the hospitality industry with nearly billion in debt. A., and its affiliates in their Chapter 11 proceedings, which involved the restructuring of more than 0 million.

Sungevity filed for chapter 11 with approximately 5 million in prepetition debt, including funded debt, trade debt, and potential employee related claims.(Bankr. and its affiliates, which filed for bankruptcy in April 2014.

Bienenstock, Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, New York, NY, of counsel, for Appellees Texaco, Inc., and Texaco Carribean, Inc. Stockholders Liquidating Trust (the “Panex Trust”), Michael C. § 6972, and the common law, asserted against them as distributees of Duplan, were discharged in the Duplan bankruptcy proceeding and therefore, the Final Decree should be enforced to prohibit further proceedings on those claims. Upon confirmation of a plan,the plan and its provisions shall be binding upon the debtor, upon every other corporation issuing securities or acquiring property under the plan, and upon all creditors and stockholders, whether or not such creditors and stockholders are affected by the plan or have accepted it or have filed proofs of their claims or interest and whether or not their claims or interests have been scheduled or allowed or are allowable.11 U. The Discharge in the Final Decree terminated all of the debtors' debts and liabilities except as provided in the Final Decree or in the Plan. In fact, it does not even include the word claim or make any reference to the definition of a “Claim” in the Plan. We therefore affirm the District Court's affirmance of the Bankruptcy Court's denial of injunctive relief as to the CERCLA claims. The Oil Companies Are Prohibited As A Matter Of Law From Bringing Their RCRA Claims Neither the bankruptcy court nor the district court addressed whether the RCRA claims brought by the Oil Companies were discharged in Duplan's bankruptcy proceeding. Section 6972(a) provides for citizen suits to restrain PRPs from continuing to “present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment” and/or to clean up a site that “present[s] an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment.” 42 U. In February, 1992 Texaco and others entered into an Administrative Order of Consent (“AOC”) with the EPA. Y.1995) (discussing when claims for damage to property caused by contamination arise). These matters are disputed in this case, and thus require the bankruptcy court to make findings of fact.Her extensive experience also includes representation of bankruptcy examiners, bankruptcy trustees, liquidating trustees, and other post-confirmation creditor fiduciaries. Hager is an active member of the business restructuring community. She has been rated AV preeminent by her peers in the Martindale-Hubbell Peer Review Ratings and has been recognized by Legal 500 US (2015) in the area of corporate restructuring. D., magna cum laude, from Quinnipiac School of Law in Hamden, CT, where she was an editor of the Law Review. This monitor makes it easier than ever to communicate over the internet.It's also great for entertainment thanks to it's Full HD screen size of 21.5″.